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ARMY AVIATION'S ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in increased regional conflicts and instability throughout the world. In areas where U.S. national interests have been threatened, we employed our Army to protect our interests or assist an ally. As a member of a joint task force (JTF) or multinational coalition, the Army has conducted humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. Since these initiatives have been conducted in peacetime and since their missions were not entirely hostile, these operations are doctrinally classified as operations other than war (OOTW). In each of the operations discussed in this study, Army Aviation has been a major contributor.

Army Aviation provides the force commander a great deal of flexibility and versatility across the spectrum of OOTW. Army Aviation has the unique capability to perform combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. This study will examine lessons learned from "Operation Provide Comfort," "Operation Restore Hope," and "Operation Uphold Democracy." It will review joint doctrine, and Army doctrine to determine the adequacy of current aviation doctrine, force structure, and training required to support peace operations.

INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union and the U.S. led coalition defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War has produced what former President George Bush described as a "new world order." Many envisioned a massive outbreak of peace as nations attempted to re-establish democratic forms of government and develop free market economies, while potential aggressors would be held in check by the fear of multinational retaliation. Instead, we have witnessed renewed conflicts caused by long standing ethnic / religious hatreds and political discord. The new world order has not been so orderly, after all.

In Iraq, Saddam Hussein turned his surviving army against the Kurds in northern Iraq, who rebelled when they thought his defeat was eminent. In Somalia, drought, fiscal mismanagement, and civil war created massive starvation and death as local warlords jockeyed for control of the country. In June of 1994, it took a U.S. led effort to restore Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean Betrand Aristide to power. President Aristide was elected in February 1991 and seven months later overthrown in a coup led by the head of the Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAd'H), Lieutenant General Raul Cedras.¹ Recently, Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims signed a peace agreement ending a desperate civil war that had the potential to spread throughout the Balkans. Each of these crises has increased global and regional instability and caused much death and massive human suffering.

How has the United States responded to these tragic and disruptive situations? In 1991 the U.S. led a joint effort "Operation Provide Comfort" to provide humanitarian aid and protection to the Iraqi Kurds. In concert with the United Nations, "Operation Restore Hope" was mounted to restore peace and provide humanitarian aid to the starving people of Somalia.² The U.S. renewed its direct support to the Republic of Haiti in September of 1994 when it led a multinational force during "Operation Uphold Democracy" and restored President Aristide to power. Currently, the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division, operating under the auspices of NATO, is conducting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Army Aviation has played a pivotal role in the successful prosecution of all of these crises. All of these operations were conducted under the broad heading of Peace Operations.

What exactly is Army Aviation's role in peacekeeping operations? How adequate is current joint, Army, and aviation doctrine? Does Army Aviation's current force structure support the conduct of peacekeeping operations? Is there a need to conduct special training to prepare Army Aviation units and personnel for peacekeeping duties? This paper seeks to answer these questions and provide insights on the adequacy of doctrine, aviation force structure, and training required to conduct and support peacekeeping operations.

This paper will review current doctrinal manuals and lessons learned from past peacekeeping operations to determine if

existing doctrine is adequate. With regards to force structure, it will focus on the aviation brigade. The paper will review training undertaken by previous aviation peacekeepers to determine if special training is required to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are subsets of operations other than war. We should distinguish peacekeeping from peace-enforcement. Both kinds of operations serve the ends (objectives) in our National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, but they are executed in different ways (concepts), with different means (resources).

Traditional peacekeeping operations take place when a cease-fire has been established and the former combatant parties consent to the operation. The peacekeeping force enters an area when peace has been established. Their missions normally consist of demilitarizing combatants, maintaining cease-fire agreements, and providing humanitarian assistance. Peacekeeping can serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, providing regional security, and fostering economic growth.³

In sharp contrast, peace-enforcement operations entail the physical interposition of our armed forces to separate ongoing combatants in order to create a cease-fire. Peace-enforcers will engage in direct combat and will become the targets of either or both combatants because they were uninvited.⁴

Our National Military Strategy states that "we will support traditional peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis. When

warranted by circumstances and national interests, this support may include participation by U.S. combat units."⁵ Our National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) clearly state that when U.S. vital interests are at stake, U.S. armed forces (means) will be used to secure the peace (ends). This concept (ways) is enacted through selective engagement of U.S. armed forces in peacekeeping operations.

Clearly, the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy promulgate the use of U.S. armed forces to perform peacekeeping operations. The National Military Strategy recognizes the need for a multilateral approach when conducting peacekeeping operations; calls for an increased emphasis on burden sharing; requires that clear objectives and rules of engagement be specified to guide our forces in the proper execution of their mission.⁶ More importantly, the broad concepts set forth in our National Military Strategy must be translated into doctrine that guides and supports Army Aviation forces during the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Doctrine is the engine that drives force structure, training, and actual warfighting. Current doctrine must provide a frame of reference for aviation forces to plan and execute peacekeeping operations.

DOCTRINE

The end of the Cold War and the coalition victory in the Persian Gulf War resulted in major changes in our strategic environment. The end of the Cold War left the U.S. without a major peer competitor. I believe the Persian Gulf War will be the last large scale conventional war fought during this century.

Future conflicts will be regional in nature; they will most likely fall into the category of Operations Other Than War. They will not always be resolved through direct action. Participation in peacekeeping operations, disaster relief operations, and humanitarian relief operations will be the norm. The Army will participate in these operations as a member of a joint task force or as part of a multinational coalition.

As a rule, Army Aviation will conduct peacekeeping operations as a member of a combined arms team and in a joint environment. Fiscal constraints, reduced force structure, and competing crises will not allow the U.S. to conduct extended unilateral peacekeeping missions. As demonstrated in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, our armed forces will participate in multinational peacekeeping operations. Planning multinational operations, command and control issues, and interoperability issues will present numerous on-going challenges for our leadership.⁷ Our joint doctrine must address these issues and provide the framework for our participation in joint/combined and multinational peacekeeping operations.

Joint Doctrine

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations are very useful publications. Joint Pub 3-07 discusses OOTW from a strategic perspective. The manual covers the difference between OOTW and war, explains the relationship between OOTW and political objectives, and describes planning considerations for OOTW. A key chapter in the manual (Chapter Four) covers all aspects of planning for OOTW and provides a framework for a joint forces commander (JFC).⁸

The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations is designed as a "how to" manual for senior commanders who have been charged with standing up a JTF for the purpose of conducting a peacekeeping operation. It covers the duties and responsibilities of a Commander, JTF (CJTF) as he builds his team. Particular attention is given to obtaining unity of effort at the military, political, and cultural levels.⁹ The CJTF's ability to establish unity of effort among inter-service and coalition forces is critical.

Unity of effort was demonstrated by Army Aviation and the U.S. Navy during "Operation Uphold Democracy". The 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade deployed 51 Army helicopters aboard the Navy carrier USS Eisenhower to conduct an air assault into Port-au-Prince, Haiti.¹⁰ Their ability to deploy and operate from an aircraft carrier demonstrates Army Aviation's potential as a strategical early-entry force. Equally as important, the mission

allowed the CJTF to exploit the attributes of two services to support the mission's success. The successful completion of this mission speaks highly of the flexibility and versatility inherent to Army Aviation.

Army Doctrine

Army doctrine promulgated in FM 100-5, Operations serves as a guide for operations across a wider range of military options than in previous versions. Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are discussed throughout the manual. The tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization have now been included in OOTW. The tenet versatility was added to stress the requirement for our forces and leaders to be trained and ready for these type of operations. Chapter 13 of the manual contains six principles (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) that govern the conduct of OOTW.¹¹ The manual also discusses how the National Command Authority employs Army forces in OOTW to support our National Military Strategy.

The importance of the interagency process and the integration of all elements of national power is stressed in the 1993 edition of the manual. Again, Chapter 13 describes how a CINC (Combatant Commander) can employ OOTW to achieve regional as well as national objectives.¹² I believe the authors of the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, thoroughly understood the new strategic environment; their inclusion of OOTW provides a guide for employing Army and Army Aviation units in peacekeeping operations.

Our capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, is the "think piece" which provides principles that drive how we think about conducting peacekeeping operations. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, builds on the tenets and principles contained in FM 100-5. The manual serves as a procedural guide for commanders and staffs who must plan and conduct a peacekeeping operation.

FM 100-23 provides a "how to" guide for peacekeeping operations conducted in a multinational environment. The manual describes command, control, and support relationships in a joint or multinational environment. It appears to be the first manual in the hierarchy of Army doctrinal publications that discusses using Army Aviation during peace operations. The manual states that attack helicopters and observation/scout helicopters are important target acquisition, deterrent, and attack assets that can be employed during peace operations.¹³ Further, employing Army Aviation in such a manner demonstrates the versatility that an Army Aviation task force equipped with modern systems affords the force commander.

The 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (LI) served as the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for a period during "Operation Continue Hope." The brigade task force consisted of a composite attack and assault battalion, a light infantry battalion, a forward support battalion, and numerous slice elements under the command and control of the brigade headquarters. The brigade also had OPCON, a Q-36 radar, and mortars for counter-mortar missions.¹⁴

The challenge for the brigade commander and his staff was to coordinate and integrate the Q-36 radar, attack helicopters, and mortars in conducting counter-mortar fire missions. In situations where collateral damage was a concern, the brigade employed attack helicopters to engage and destroy mortar positions. This method of employment proved to be very effective. Numerous lessons were learned concerning engaging targets with the 20mm cannon, using the OH-58D to designate targets for precision-guided munitions, and the need for laser pointers on non-modernized aircraft.

The brigade after action review stated that "doctrine on the use of attack helicopters as a fire support asset is lacking." However, FM 1-100, Army Aviation In Combat Operations, provides a framework for the employment of aviation in conventional fire support operations. The perceived void in doctrine existed because of the nonstandard nature of the mission in "Operation Continue Hope." Rules of Engagement (ROE) and restrictions on collateral damage did not support the standard employment of indirect fire support assets. This required the commander to think out of the box and employ an ad hoc force to accomplish the mission. The Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) after-action review (20 September 93) implies aviation brigades are not used to controlling indirect fire assets.¹⁵ I disagree with this implication: The aviation brigade's mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces; it uses fire and maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at the critical time and place. The

brigade can accomplish it's mission as a pure-aviation brigade or as a task-organized force. When acting as a tactical combat force headquarters and task-organized with direct support DS) artillery, the brigade does plan and control indirect fires. Artillery fires are integrated when the brigade performs suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), joint air attack team operations (JAAT), and air assault operations (AASLT).¹⁶ The requirement for indirect fire support planning and integration is covered under employment roles and principles of the aviation brigade in FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades.

I believe the initial absence of the brigade fire support element (FSE), ad hoc task organization, and environment were key elements in the inability of the 10th MTN Div's aviation brigade to properly plan and control indirect assets. The brigade FSE deployed to Somalia in a civil-military role. Therefore, the brigade fire support officer (FSO) was not initially involved in planning fire support operations for the brigade. Normally, Q-36 radars are controlled by a direct support artillery battalion. The DS battalion commander assists in planning and employs the system based on the needs of the supported maneuver commander. In this case, the Q-36 was OPCON to the brigade, was being employed in concert with the infantry battalion's mortars and there was no DS battalion to supervise its use. Lastly, the urban sprawl of Mogadishu and concerns for collateral damage made employing the mortars and attack helicopters as fire support platforms difficult.¹⁷ I do agree there is a doctrinal void in the area of

tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing attack helicopters as fire support platforms in Mounted Operations In Urban Terrain (MOUT), precisely the type environment the 10th Avn Bde was operating in.

Aviation Doctrine

Each peacekeeping mission will take place in a different environment, so the aviation forces employed will be different as well. However, we must make every effort to incorporate lessons learned into doctrine. The strategic realities of the world require an Aviation doctrine that supports our warfighting skills as well as our roles in peacekeeping operations. It is incumbent upon the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Aviation Warfighting Center to develop publications that set forth tactics, techniques and procedures for the conduct of peace operations.

Current Army Aviation doctrine does not adequately support the employment of Army Aviation forces in conducting peacekeeping operations. FM 1-100, Doctrinal Principles for Army Aviation In Combat Operations (1989), does not reference OOTW but it briefly addresses peacekeeping operations in a very broad manner. The manual is obviously dated, so it is undergoing revision by the Army Aviation Warfighting Center.

FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades (August 1990), does a good job of describing the roles and missions of the aviation brigade at echelons above corps, corps, and division level. The manual also addresses aviation brigades organic to the airborne, air assault,

and light infantry divisions. FM 1-111 describes peacekeeping as one of four operational categories of low-intensity conflict.¹⁸ Under the range of military operations, FM 100-5 classifies the Army's activities during peacetime and conflict as operations other than war.¹⁹ Peacekeeping is listed as a category of operations other than war. FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalion, does not make any reference to peacekeeping operations. In general, current doctrine does not provide sufficient specific guidance on the uses of Army Aviation in peace operations.

In August 1993, the Aviation Warfighting Center published an "Aviation Warfighting Treatise." The Treatise contains much of the language found in FM 100-5. It states that its purpose "to explain the essence of Aviation and the doctrinal principles upon which it is employed across the range of military operations."²⁰ It does a good job of explaining doctrinal principles, mentions OOTW, and describes Army Aviation as an early entry force. However, it is not a substitute for a much needed update of Army Aviation doctrinal publications. Doctrine influences how we organize, train, and equip our forces. It must be current and relevant in order to clearly define Army Aviation's role in peacekeeping operations. The Army Aviation Warfighting Center must hasten the production and distribution of new doctrinal materials.

Needed immediately are doctrinal updates based on the experiences of the 10th Mtn Div during "Operation Restore Hope" and "Operation Uphold Democracy". Lessons learned by the

division's aviation brigade indicates there is a lack of doctrine concerning aviation operations in a MOUT environment. FM 1-112 states "Attack helicopters are not well suited to fight over urbanized terrain. The attack helicopter battalion should operate on the outskirts of an urban area and attack mechanized forces that attempt to bypass or envelop friendly forces in the built up area.²¹ This is all the manual offers on the use of attack helicopters in a MOUT environment.

In Somalia, buildings restricted inter-visibility with targets, prevented multiple aircraft engagements, and made mutual support difficult. I believe a doctrinal update will assist in determining the best use of Army Aviation in a MOUT environment. If operations in urban areas continues to be the norm, we must develop procedures that maximize visionics and weapons systems.

We must not lose sight that doctrine must be dynamic. As we review past operations and bring ongoing operations to a close, after-action reports and lessons learned must be incorporated as doctrinal updates.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Over the past 10 years Army Aviation has undergone numerous force structure changes in an effort to stay abreast of doctrinal changes, to meet current and emerging threats, modernize, and remain within imposed fiscal constraints. In 1975, the Aviation Requirements to support the Combat Structure of the Army (ARCSA)

study III was initiated. The study recommended consolidating aviation units at division level with the appropriate command and control to fully exploit the potential of Army Aviation. Further, the study set forth the development of current attack helicopter doctrine. However, units designed under this study were too large and difficult to command and control. In the 1980s, the Division 86 study resulted in a redesign of aviation units which improved command and control and gave birth to the Aviation Brigade. Units created under this design were fightable, sustainable but unaffordable.²² In 1983, reorganization under the Army Of Excellence created an aviation brigade the was too austere. Some CONUS based units lost an attack battalion to the corps. Additionally, door gunners were deleted from the MTO&E; the maintenance company was moved to the DISCOM; pilots were resourced at a rate of one per aircraft, which meant that the battalion staff was required to perform primary pilot duties during the course of battle; and personnel were cut but mission requirements did not change. The brigade's ability to perform 24 hour operations, critical staff planning functions, and man multiple tactical command posts was severely limited.²³

Major changes in our strategic environment; coupled with fiscal constraints; the need to modernize aircraft; and the need to correct AOE shortcomings, resulted in the implementation of the Army Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). The Aviation Restructure Initiative proposes restructuring the force by moving older aircraft out of the inventory and increasing like aircraft

in units. For example, the L-series MTO&E attack battalion consisted of 18 AH-64's, 13 OH-58's and 3 UH-60's. After ARI conversion, the unit will be equipped with 24 AH-64's only. ARI streamlines maintenance operations by leaving the attack battalion with one air frame. It also creates a General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) of 24 UH-60's or an Assault Helicopter Battalion (ASLT BN) of 38 UH-60's at division level. Further economies of scale will be recognized with the creation of a Division Aviation Support Battalion (DSAB) to provide logistical support for the aviation brigade.²⁴

ARI will carry Army Aviation into the future as we retire OH-58's, UH-1H's, and AH-1F Cobras. Army Aviation will field the Apache Longbow and continue fielding the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in certain units until the RH-66 Comanche is fielded. However, ARI is not without shortcomings. The attack battalion staffs are not resourced with enough commissioned officers in their S-3 sections to conduct 24 hour operations and they have a limited liaison capability. The attack battalion's are also not authorized a school trained tactical intelligence officer (S-2) and no field artillery officer (FSO). The S-2 positions are being filled by Aviation Branch officers.²⁵

The homogenous design of the ARI aviation brigade requires the brigade to task organize to conduct most operations. I believe a task organized aviation brigade is capable of conducting peacekeeping operations. The brigade commander must insure a very detailed mission analysis is conducted and the

force is task organized in accordance with the mission and each unit's capabilities. External personnel and equipment requirements must be identified early during the mission analysis to facilitate their integration. Habitual training relationships, force tailoring, and known standard operating procedures (SOPs) will offset existing MTO&E shortcomings.

In sum, our modernization effort appears to be on track. But in today's world, downsizing and fiscal constraints do not support increases in personnel to offset real or perceived MTO&E design flaws. Again, I believe the ARI MTO&E aviation brigade can effectively perform peacekeeping operations.

TRAINING

The former TRADOC Commander, General Frederick M. Franks claimed that "The U.S. Army is truly a strategic force. It is frequently at the center of the joint team. How, then do we prepare for war and operations other than war? Our decision has been to prepare for the most demanding of these-war."²⁶ General Franks believes that current Army doctrine is adequate; he believes that a good battle-focused training program will allow units to quickly transition to OOTW missions.

In part, I agree with Gen Franks. Yet there are those who believe that participating in peacekeeping operations is detrimental to our warfighting skills. Lieutenant General S.L. Arnold, former Commander, 10th Mtn Div, indicates the contrary.

In Somalia, his units performed missions that were derived directly from their mission essential task lists (METL).²⁷ In essence, many of his units' mission essential tasks overlapped with their peacekeeping duties. They were able to maintain and enhance their perishable combat skills during "Operation Restore Hope".

As a former commander of a forward deployed AH-64 attack helicopter squadron, my mission essential task list consisted of the following tasks: conduct deployment; conduct attack operations (hasty & deliberate); conduct reconnaissance (route, zone, and area); conduct security (screen operations), and conduct sustainment. The skills required for wartime proficiency in these tasks are easily transferred to the skills used in peacekeeping operations. The ability to perform reconnaissance and security operations during a peacekeeping mission is critical.

Scout weapons team (SWT) can be employed to reconnoiter routes ahead of convoys and provide security for elements moving along the route. Units equipped with AH-64's can video routes and choke points prior to movement along the route. SWT's can also conduct surveillance missions over the operational area. Aircraft equipped with thermal imaging systems such as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the AH-64 Apache give the force commander a true night capability. Employing aircraft in built-up areas can eliminate the need to put ground forces in harms way without the proper reconnaissance. Such missions reduce the chance of contact

with local personnel, are not threatening to the local population, and provide valuable intelligence.²⁸ They also send a signal to would-be belligerents that they may be observed. Thus they serve as a deterrent to would-be aggressors.

During "Operation Restore Hope", the 10th Mountain Division's cavalry squadron provided armed reconnaissance and security for the force. The AH-1 Cobra had a great impact. The psychological effect of attack helicopters established the aircraft's value - even without firing a shot. The air assault battalion gave the force commander the ability to project force by placing soldiers on the ground wherever needed.²⁹ Without doubt, proficiency in conducting our wartime missions can contribute to the successful accomplishment of peacekeeping missions. There are also other unique aspects of peacekeeping missions that are not normal METL tasks and most units do not train for them. I believe we must.

During "Operation Uphold Democracy" the 10th Mtn Div's aviation brigade operated from the USS. Eisenhower. Operating from the carrier presented a great training opportunity for the brigade. More importantly, it demonstrated Army Aviation's ability to act as an early entry force. It took a tremendous amount of training and planning. Numerous lessons were learned about storing cargo and ammunition, about conducting Night Vision Goggle operations, and about flight deck operations aboard an aircraft carrier.³⁰ Operating from the carrier proved to be an excellent method of projecting power. Obviously, this event

crosses the bounds of doctrine and training. I strongly recommend the publication of a Army or joint manual detailing the training requirements and the "how to" for such an operation. Doctrine must be addressed if such missions become the norm for Army Aviation and U.S. Naval forces.

I also believe our soldiers and leaders must make a mental transition when conducting peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations require a certain level of restraint and non-aggressive actions. Situations will arise where the ability to negotiate rather than use overwhelming firepower will win the day.

In a multinational peacekeeping operation, Army Aviation will support U.S. and coalition forces. When Army Aviation supports coalition forces, equipment incompatibility, language barriers, and organizational capabilities can cause major problems. Liaison Officer (LNO) support for coalition forces is a must. The LNO represents the commander, but does not have his authority. He/she must be tactically proficient, properly equipped, and competent in all aspects of Army Aviation operations. When conditions permit, the LNO should live with the supported unit full time, or at least on a mission basis.

Rules of engagement (ROE) are one of the most important aspects of peacekeeping operations. They must be clear, concise, and fully understood at all levels. Soldiers must believe that they can perform their missions as well as survive within the rules. ROE that authorize a graduated response in the use of

force are required.³¹ The Center for Army Lessons Learned has developed a series of aviation vignettes and STX's to train units and soldiers on observance of ROE. The 10th Mountain Division's aviation brigade positioned a Judge Advocate General officer (JAG) in their tactical operations center during operations. Confronted with unclear situations, individual aviators and leaders could request guidance and clarification immediately. The JAG insured actions taken by commanders at all levels complied with the ever-changing ROE.³² Complete dissemination of ROE, good leadership, and disciplined soldiers are the keys to making ROE work.

The ability to negotiate is considered a very important skill for officers participating in peacekeeping operations. The ability to communicate and understand cultural differences will pay dividends in conflict management and resolution.³³ This skill ought to be taught to senior NCO's as well as officers during predeployment training. I recommend the owning MACOM employ a mobile training team from the Army Peacekeeping Institute to conduct train the trainer sessions for their subordinate units. If possible, include as many soldiers as possible. A young specialist on a check point using his negotiating skills could prevent a situation from getting out of hand. In PKO's little things can mean a lot.

Training is the "work of the Army." We should train for conducting peacekeeping operations just as hard as we train to conduct our wartime missions. The 10th Mtn Div's experiences

clearly indicates the requirement to perform wartime tasks during peacekeeping operations exists. As required by their higher headquarters, aviation brigades must add OOTW to their mission essential task lists. Special emphasis must be given to honing peacekeeping skills that are not on our METL. Army Aviation can insure success in peacekeeping operations by conducting battle drill, simplifying and standardizing how we fight, and building straightforward, usable SOP's. Commanders must identify tasks that overlap, cross train soldiers, and build depth in their organizations through good battle focused training programs. Our CTC's must give priority to training units for peacekeeping operations. We must learn to train as we will keep peace. The officers and soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division's aviation brigade learned too much through trial and error. It is imperative that we organize, plan, and conduct aviation training to benefit from their lessons learned.

CONCLUSION

Army Aviation doctrine concerning peace operations is lacking in production. I believe the research conducted in this study and the available joint, Army, and Army Aviation manuals cited, clearly support this fact. Our National Security Strategy; the National Military Strategy, and the realities of a new strategical environment demands the development of doctrine for aviation forces that is flexible and versatile. The Aviation

Warfighting Center must inculcate lessons learned and produce a new series of manuals that adequately address peacekeeping operations. New doctrine will drive the way we organize, train, and equip our aviation forces.

I strongly believe ARI and our modernization plan is sufficient to carry Army Aviation into the Force XXI era. I see no need to design or create new organizations for the purpose of conducting peacekeeping operations. Yes, there are flaws in the MTO&E of the aviation brigade and task organization is required to conduct many of its missions. However, these flaws are offset by modern systems, operating as a member of a combined or joint force, and superb training programs. More importantly, the downsizing of our force and fiscal constraints will not support adding new force structure. We must correct shortcomings from within the force using existing forces which is exactly what ARI has done.

Army Aviation is a strategic force. It can self-deploy or embark aboard U.S. Navy carriers to conduct early entry operations and project power. Inherent in Army Aviation task forces is the ability to quickly mass, conduct crowd control operations, perform reconnaissance/security operations, and dominate key terrain by fire when required. Army Aviation assets can collect real-time intelligence, which allows a commander to get inside an adversary's decision cycle and make timely decisions on the employment of his forces. It increases the force commander's span of control by dominating the area of operations

through aerial means. To accomplish these tasks, commander's must develop battle focused and METL driven training programs. I believe attaining and maintaining proficiency in our wartime tasks will allow units to quickly transition to performing peacekeeping operations. Tasks that are unique to peacekeeping or a particular area must be identified and given special training emphasis.

In sum, Army Aviation's role in peacekeeping operations is very similar to its wartime role. It provides security, performs command and control, collects intelligence, and allows the force commander to apply decisive combat power if needed.

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